Tools for Designing, Evaluating, and Certifying NextGen Technologies and Procedures: Automation Roles and Responsibilities

Barbara Kanki from NASA Ames Research Center will discuss research that focuses on the collaborations between pilots, air traffic controllers and dispatchers that will change in NextGen systems as automation increases and roles and responsibilities change. The approach taken by this NASA Ames team is to build a collaborative systems assessment template (CSAT) based on detailed task descriptions within each system to establish a baseline of the current operations. The collaborative content and context are delineated through the review of regulatory and advisory materials, policies, procedures and documented practices as augmented by field observations and interviews. The CSAT is developed to aid the assessment of key human factors and performance tradeoffs that result from considering different collaborative arrangements under NextGen system changes. In theory, the CSAT product may be applied to any NextGen application (such as Trajectory Based Operations) with specified ground and aircraft capabilities

Upset Recovery Human Factors

Accident and incident analyses as well as industry group concerns and recommendations have justified taking a second look at proficiency standards related to upset recovery training and performance. Quite a number of factors and theories have been suggested-- leading the NASA Aviation Safety Program to reconsider manual handling skills in highly automated aircraft particularly in conditions that can potentially lead to Loss of Control events. Our team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) first identified 76 Basic Recovery Skills that were important for effective crew response under five different anomaly conditions. In addition to manual handling skills, the skill set included knowledge and cognitive skills, as well as decision making and management skills. Advanced Recovery Skills were identified by combining skills, integrating with crew resource management skills, and developing heuristics for decision making.Using the Advanced Recovery Skill set, the SMEs then developed a generic process flow starting from the problem discovery phase (e.g., identifying an anomaly) through the decision making and management phase (e.g., assessing response options), through the recovery phase (e.g., controlling the aircraft). The generic process flow was refined by testing it against six additional scenarios. The next part of the project was to develop an approach for assessing and revising a generic training curriculum (we used an operators Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) as a framework). Although many of the Basic and Advanced Recovery Skills could be found in the Job Task Listing, they were not always structured or combined in the most effective way. Recommendations were developed for assessing relevant aspects of the Job Task Listing and Continuing Qualification curriculum so that the more comprehensive set of Upset Recovery skillsincluding Human Factors--could be trained and assessed in the most appropriate and effective context. The existing AQP methodology provides a natural way to insert targeted Upset Recovery skills into its system of proficiency objectives, training devices, training activities, and ultimately, into the event sets of a simulator training scenario

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies

Near-Term Nextgen and Class 2 EFBS

This study is based on data collected at the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) Advanced Software and Authorization Workshop for US operators currently involved in EFB software evaluation or implementation for their own fleets. With most US operators not taking delivery of new, larger aircraft in the next few years, they are considering ways of displaying near-term NextGen data on board existing aircraft through systems such as the EFB. The workshop collected operator near-term needs in the areas of EFB user interface and standardization and EFB advanced software applications. The analysis of the data collected during the workshop provided a prioritized list of operator needs over the next few years with an emphasis on runway safety and related NextGen systems. The study reports on those needs in the context of near-term NextGen systems and Class 2 EFBs

Personality factors in flight operations. Volume 1: Leader characteristics and crew performance in a full-mission air transport simulation

Crew effectiveness is a joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics of team members. As obvious as this point might seem, both traditional approaches to optimizing crew performance and more recent training development highlighting crew coordination have emphasized only the skill and attitudinal dimensions. This volume is the first in a series of papers on this simulation. A subsequent volume will focus on patterns of communication within crews. The results of a full-mission simulation research study assessing the impact of individual personality on crew performance is reported. Using a selection algorithm described in previous research, captains were classified as fitting one of three profiles along a battery of personality assessment scales. The performances of 23 crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one-and-one-half-day simulated trip. Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement motivation and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Instrumental profile (high levels of competitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, and impatience and irritability) were less effective on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results underscore the importance of stable personality variables as predictors of team coordination and performance

The impact of cockpit automation on crew coordination and communication. Volume 1: Overview, LOFT evaluations, error severity, and questionnaire data

The purpose was to examine, jointly, cockpit automation and social processes. Automation was varied by the choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit derivative, the MD-88. Airline pilot volunteers flew a mission in the simulator for these aircraft. Results show that the performance differences between the crews of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews. Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than did the MD-88 pilots. There were no significant differences between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of errors committed during the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) flight. The attitude questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failed to distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 crews

Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (3rd edition)

In 2008 we published the first set of guidelines for standardizing research in autophagy. Since then, research on this topic has continued to accelerate, and many new scientists have entered the field. Our knowledge base and relevant new technologies have also been expanding. Accordingly, it is important to update these guidelines for monitoring autophagy in different organisms. Various reviews have described the range of assays that have been used for this purpose. Nevertheless, there continues to be confusion regarding acceptable methods to measure autophagy, especially in multicellular eukaryotes. For example, a key point that needs to be emphasized is that there is a difference between measurements that monitor the numbers or volume of autophagic elements (e.g., autophagosomes or autolysosomes) at any stage of the autophagic process versus those that measure fl ux through the autophagy pathway (i.e., the complete process including the amount and rate of cargo sequestered and degraded). In particular, a block in macroautophagy that results in autophagosome accumulation must be differentiated from stimuli that increase autophagic activity, defi ned as increased autophagy induction coupled with increased delivery to, and degradation within, lysosomes (inmost higher eukaryotes and some protists such as Dictyostelium ) or the vacuole (in plants and fungi). In other words, it is especially important that investigators new to the fi eld understand that the appearance of more autophagosomes does not necessarily equate with more autophagy. In fact, in many cases, autophagosomes accumulate because of a block in trafficking to lysosomes without a concomitant change in autophagosome biogenesis, whereas an increase in autolysosomes may reflect a reduction in degradative activity. It is worth emphasizing here that lysosomal digestion is a stage of autophagy and evaluating its competence is a crucial part of the evaluation of autophagic flux, or complete autophagy. Here, we present a set of guidelines for the selection and interpretation of methods for use by investigators who aim to examine macroautophagy and related processes, as well as for reviewers who need to provide realistic and reasonable critiques of papers that are focused on these processes. These guidelines are not meant to be a formulaic set of rules, because the appropriate assays depend in part on the question being asked and the system being used. In addition, we emphasize that no individual assay is guaranteed to be the most appropriate one in every situation, and we strongly recommend the use of multiple assays to monitor autophagy. Along these lines, because of the potential for pleiotropic effects due to blocking autophagy through genetic manipulation it is imperative to delete or knock down more than one autophagy-related gene. In addition, some individual Atg proteins, or groups of proteins, are involved in other cellular pathways so not all Atg proteins can be used as a specific marker for an autophagic process. In these guidelines, we consider these various methods of assessing autophagy and what information can, or cannot, be obtained from them. Finally, by discussing the merits and limits of particular autophagy assays, we hope to encourage technical innovation in the field

Human Factors Design of Electronic Documents

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), working with the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) Industry Group, is developing a new MMEL electronic format. The MMEL refers to a series of documents controlled by the FAA that lists equipment that may be inoperative under certain conditions while still allowing the aircraft to be airworthy. Each aircraft model has an MMEL, and operators must work with that master document to determine the relief items for their specific aircraft. The resulting Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for an operator\u27s aircraft is used by both ground personnel and pilots to determine the procedures for maintaining airworthiness. Currently, the MMEL is available in text format, and the industry needs an electronic format that is more efficient and that will be compatible with key aspects of future data standards. Members of the MMEL Industry Group were surveyed to determine the main user needs and human factors considerations for the development and evaluation of the MMEL electronic format. This study identifies key operator needs that can direct the development of not only the new MMEL format but also the broader category of aviation electronic documents

Optimizing EFB Use Through Training, Standards, and Best Practices

The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) provides an integrated information management system that promises new capabilities and benefits to pilots, but information access and display differs substantially from traditional paper documents. Pilots must understand what information is available and where it is located, how data is accessed and entered, and how this system interacts with other aircraft systems. Operators must develop standards, best practices and training that will optimize the EFB capabilities and ensure safe and effective crew performance. This paper presents how key training and procedural enhancements as well as the identification of best practices can be identified during the EFB operational evaluation for incorporation into ongoing line operations

Beyond Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) Approval: Improving Crew Performance

As operators evaluate and implement Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs), the emphasis has been on their operational approval and certification. This research provides data that demonstrate how an operator can aim beyond the limited objectives of the EFB approval process to improving crew performance. This paper reports on evaluation results that show how crews working with an EFB can not only equal, but can exceed the performance of those working with traditional paper documents